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ABSTRACT 
 
Non-compete agreements are commonly used in both 
the United States and China, and are regarded as an 
important means for employers to prevent employees or 
rival companies from using valuable trade secrets for 
competitive purposes. Despite their popularity, however, 
the enforceability of non-competes in both countries can be 
difficult to determine. In the U.S., the level to which non-
competes are fully enforced varies by jurisdiction. While 
some state courts apply a “rule of reason,” others, such as 
California, prohibit non-competes altogether. In contrast, 
Chinese courts tend to support non-competes. This Article 
provides a comparative perspective of non-competes in the 
U.S. and China, highlighting different factors that the two 
countries consider when deciding enforceability. 
Specifically, courts in the U.S. focus on the existence of 
legitimate business interests, while courts in China focus 
on economic compensation. In order to curb the over-
enforcement of non-compete agreements in China and keep 
the balance between trade secret protection and employee 
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mobility, this Article recommends that China define the 
protectable business interest by statute and narrowly 
construe the validity of non-compete agreement. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Trade secrets are one of the most important types of intellectual 
property. Approximately seventy percent of the market value of 
U.S. companies exists in the form of trade secrets and other types 
of intellectual property.1 Trade secrets range from the formula for 
Coca-Cola to the client list of a small startup company. Employees 
create and accumulate trade secrets in the course of their work. 
Over the course of their employment, employees may learn about 
technology, designs and specifications, and gain access to 
customer lists, sales and financial data; such knowledge of trade 
secrets makes them more valuable to their employer, but also to the 
employer’s competitors. For this reason, departure of employees to 
competing companies has become one of the primary channels for 
trade secret misappropriation, and companies must take measures 
to protect their trade secrets from disclosure by former employees 
to third parties and competitors.2 
To this end, the non-compete agreement (“non-compete”)3 has 
been widely used by companies as the primary weapon with which 
to protect trade secrets from misappropriation by former 
employees and to maintain a competitive position in the 
marketplace. In 2010, more than seventy-eight percent of all chief-
executive employment contracts in the U.S. contained a non-
compete provision.4 
Yet, despite the undisputed benefit to employers, scholars 
highlight a significant negative side effect of non-competes: their 
impact on knowledge dissemination.5  To continue to encourage 
                                                                                                             
1 See William M. Fitzpatrick, Samuel A. DiLullo, & Donald R. Burke, 
Trade Secret Piracy and Protection: Corporate Espionage, Corporate Security 
and the Law, 12 ADVANCES IN COMPETITIVENESS RES. 57 (2004). 
2 Id. 
3 There are several names used for a non-compete, such as a “covenant not 
to compete,” or “noncompetition agreement.” This Article uses “non-compete” 
or “non-competes.” 
4 See Chris Neumeyer, Trade Secrets and Employee Mobility in the U.S. 
and Asia, IPWATCHDOG (Oct. 9, 2013), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/ 
10/09/trade-secrets-and-employee-mobility-in-the-u-s-and-asia/id=45666/. 
5 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology 
Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 
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innovation and create a welcoming environment for technical 
talent, some states in the U.S. have limited the extent to which they 
will enforce a non-compete. 6  In China, a similar transition is 
underway. In light of this trend, the enforceability of the non-
compete in China needs to be balanced against technological 
innovation and trade secret protection. 
This Article compares the use of non-competes in the U.S. and 
China for trade secret protection. Following the introduction in 
Part I, Part II of this Article describes the need for non-competes in 
the U.S., including an overview of the history of non-competes and 
trade secret law, and a discussion of the most important factors that 
influence enforceability of non-competes—the “protectable 
business interest.” Part III compares differing approaches in both 
U.S. and Chinese courts to non-competes for trade secret 
protection. Part IV discusses the differences between the two 
countries. Lastly, Part V makes recommendations for the non-
compete legal system in China. 
 
I. NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS FOR TRADE SECRET PROTECTION  
IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
A non-compete term in an employment contract typically states 
that the employee will not work for a competitor or set up a 
competitive business for a specified period of time in a designated 
geographical area.7 It is a post-employment prohibition that bars 
the employee from what may be his or her most productive use of 
skills, knowledge, and work experience. 8  Nowadays, the non-
compete is regarded as an important and popular means for 
employers to prevent employees or competitors from using their 
valuable trade secrets. 
                                                                                                             
74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (1999); see also Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Leaky 
Covenants-Not-To-Compete As The Legal Infrastructure For Innovation, 49 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 251 (2015). 
6 See Gomulkiewicz, supra note 5. 
7 See Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. 
L. REV. 625, 626 (1960). 
8 See Charles Tait Graves & James A. Diboise, Do Strict Trade Secret and 
Non-Competition Laws Obstruct Innovation?, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 
323, 330 (2007). 
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A.  History of Non-Compete Agreements in the United States 
 
Non-competes first appeared as traditional common law 
“restraints of trade” in England more than five hundred years ago.9 
The most important case from this era remains Mitchel v. 
Reynolds,10 which recognized that partial restraints on trade under 
certain circumstances might be enforceable. 11  Although Mitchel 
related the concept of a non-compete to the sale of a business, 
rather than to employment, it deeply influenced nineteenth-century 
courts’ approach to employment-restraints in two ways: (1) it 
created an open attitude towards the validity of restrictive 
covenants,12 and (2) it introduced a standard that “balanc[ed] the 
social utility of restraints against their possible undesirable effects 
upon the covenanter and the public.”13 
Mitchel provided the basis for the modern approach to 
restraints in U.S. employment contracts.14 Since the beginning of 
the twentieth century, most American courts have applied the 
“reasonableness” standard to evaluate the enforceability of non-
competes. 15  California, which bans the enforcement of non-
competes, is the prominent exception. 
The popularity of non-competes grew in large part to the rise of 
the Industrial Revolution and the necessity of trade secret 
protection. In the pre-industrial economy, craft knowledge was 
                                                                                                             
9 See Blake, supra note 7, at 626. 
10 See Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711). In Mitchel, the 
defendant was a baker who violated a restrictive covenant he had signed when 
he leased his bakery to the plaintiff. The defendant argued that the covenant was 
invalid because he was a baker, had served an apprenticeship there, and could 
not be restrained from practicing his trade. The court supported the covenant in a 
detailed opinion justifying its decision. See also Catherine L. Fisk, Working 
Knowledge: Trade Secrets, Restrictive Covenants in Employment, and the Rise 
of Corporate Intellectual Property, 1800–1920, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 441, 454 
(2001). 
11 See Mark A. Glick, Darren Bush & Jonathan Q. Hafen, The Law and 
Economics of Post-Employment Covenants: A Unified Framework, 11 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 357, 360–70 (2002). 
12 See Fisk, supra note 10, at 455. 
13 Blake, supra note 7, at 630. 
14 Id. at 637. 
15 Glick, Bush & Hafen, supra note 11. 
5
Shangguan: A Comparative Study of Non-Compete Agreements for Trade Secret Pr
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2016
410  WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 11:5 
 
transmitted through families or from master to apprentice. Secrets 
were controlled exclusively within a family or a firm. 16  The 
Industrial Revolution dramatically altered such working 
relationships in businesses. Firms began to rely on non-competes 
so that employers could safeguard secret information learned by 
current or former employees. Courts adapted to the trends by 
expanding permissible uses of non-competes to prevent wrongful 
dissemination of knowledge.17 
 
B.  Overview of Non-Compete Agreements in Different States 
 
In the U.S., non-compete enforcement is governed by state law. 
States regulate through either statutory or common law. Twenty 
states18 have statutes which specifically regulate non-competes.19 
The remaining thirty regulate the use of non-competes via case 
law. Most states apply a “rule of reason” to non-competes,20 where 
enforceability depends on its measure of “reasonableness.” The 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts,21  for example, states that a 
restraint is reasonable if it: (1) is no greater than is needed to 
protect the [employer’s] legitimate interest; (2) does not impose 
undue hardship on an employee; and (3) is not likely to be 
injurious to the public.22 
Generally, courts decide enforceability by considering all or 
most of the following factors: (1) whether an employer’s legitimate 
business interest exists; 23  (2) whether the geographic scope is 
                                                                                                             
16 Fisk, supra note 10, at 450. 
17 Id. at 442. 
18 These states are Alabama, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, and 
Wisconsin. See BRIAN M. MALSBERGER, COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE: A 
STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (A.B.A. SEC. OF LAB. & EMP. L., 8th ed. 2012). 
19 For example, the Texas Business & Commerce Code regulates non-
competes in § 15.50 (Criteria For Enforceability of Covenants Not To Compete). 
See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (West 2009). 
20 See ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE (6th ed. 2012). 
21 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (1981). 
22 Id.; see also Blake, supra note 7, at 649. 
23 States using the rule of reason usually regard it as a prerequisite element 
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reasonable; 24  (3) whether duration is reasonable; 25  (4) whether 
adequate consideration exists;26 and (v) whether the non-compete 
violates the public policy or imposes undue hardship on the 
employee.27 
Although non-competes are enforceable in most states, 
provided that they meet the reasonableness requirement, several 
states prohibit non-competes altogether. 28  One such state is 
California, which has eliminated the common law “rule of reason” 
and reshaped its public policy in favor of open competition.29 Civil 
Code section 16600 states that “[e]xcept as provided in this 
                                                                                                             
when deciding on enforceability of non-competes. 
24 Geographic scope is another important factor when deciding 
enforceability of a non-compete. In New York, a non-compete will be enforced 
by courts “where the restrictions are reasonably limited geographically . . . to 
protect trade secrets or confidential customer lists.” Geritrex Corp. v. Dermarite 
Indus., 910 F. Supp. 955, 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
25 In Florida, “covenants that restrict or prohibit competition when they are 
limited in time . . . are permissible.” FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.331 (2016). 
26 Consideration is the basis of contract formation in the common law. 
Courts usually find adequate consideration if an employer signs a non-compete 
agreement or employment contract with the employee. However, some courts 
will not find adequate consideration if a non-compete agreement is entered into 
after an employment contract has begun and there is no independent 
consideration given. In Pollard Group, Inc. v. Labriola, 100 P.3d 791 (Wash. 
2004), the Washington State Supreme Court held that non-compete agreements 
entered into after employment has commenced are valid only when there is 
independent consideration given at the time the agreement is signed. 
27 Many courts also consider undue hardship in conjunction with geographic 
scope and/or duration. In King v. Head Start Family Hair Salons, Inc., 886 So. 
2d 769 (Ala. 2004), the Alabama Supreme Court reversed an injunction issued 
against a former employee of a hair salon that prohibited her from working 
within a two-mile radius of any location of her former employer. The Court held 
that the restriction was unreasonably broad and imposed an undue hardship on 
the employee because the employer had more than thirty locations in the 
relevant area, making it impossible for the employee to find work as a 
hairdresser. 
28 See Gomulkiewicz, supra note 5. Several states follow a variation of 
California’s strong rule on non-competes, including Hawaii, North Dakota, 
Montana, and Oklahoma. Montana and Oklahoma permit the enforcement of 
non-competes in certain circumstances, while Colorado and Oregon limit non-
competes to managers and professional workers. 
29 See Gomulkiewicz, supra note 5; see also MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, 
supra note 20, at 87. 
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chapter, every contract by which anyone is restrained from 
engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to 
that extent void.”30 Thus, non-competes are void in California,31 
subject to limited exceptions.32 
 
C.  Overview of Trade Secrets in the United States 
 
Among the most influential sources of law on the development 
of trade secrets in the U.S. are sections 757 and 758 of the 
Restatement of Torts. Published in 1939, the Restatement defines a 
trade secret as any information “used in one’s business [that gives 
its owner] an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors 
who do not know or use it.”33 
                                                                                                             
30 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (2016). 
31 The Ninth Circuit developed the “narrow-restraint” exception to Section 
16600 in Campbell v. Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 817 F.2d 499 (9th 
Cir. 1987), concluding that Section 16600 “only makes illegal those restraints 
which preclude one from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business.” 
However, in Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d 285, 293 (2008), the 
Supreme Court of California held that “California courts have not embraced the 
Ninth Circuit’s narrow-restraint exception and have been clear in their 
expression that section 16600 represents a strong public policy of the state 
which should not be diluted by judicial fiat.” 
32 Non-competition agreements are permitted if they are ancillary to the sale 
of a business and the terms of the agreements are “reasonable.” According to 
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16601 (2016): 
Any person who sells the goodwill of a business, or any owner 
of a business entity selling or otherwise disposing of all of his 
or her ownership interest in the business entity, or any owner 
of a business entity that sells (a) all or substantially all of its 
operating assets together with the goodwill of the business 
entity, (b) all or substantially all of the operating assets of a 
division or a subsidiary of the business entity together with the 
goodwill of that division or subsidiary, or (c) all of the 
ownership interest of any subsidiary, may agree with the buyer 
to refrain from carrying on a similar business within a 
specified geographic area in which the business so sold, or that 
of the business entity, division, or subsidiary has been carried 
on, so long as the buyer, or any person deriving title to the 
goodwill or ownership interest from the buyer, carries on a 
like business therein. 
33 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). See also MERGES, 
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Beginning in 1979, the National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws developed a model state statute—the 
Uniform Trade Secret Act (“UTSA”)34—which forty-eight states 
have enacted in one form or another.35 In its 1985 Amendment, the 
UTSA defined a “trade secret” as: 
 
[I]nformation, including a formula, pattern, 
compilation, program, device, method, technique, or 
process, that: (1) derives independent economic 
value, actual or potential, from not being generally 
known to, and not being readily ascertainable by 
proper means by, other persons who can obtain 
economic value from its disclosure or use, and (2) is 
the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the 
circumstances to maintain its secrecy.36 
 
Notably, this does not follow the Restatement. Instead, the 
UTSA stipulates that information is not a trade secret if it is 
“generally known” or “readily ascertainable by proper means.”37 
Therefore, once a secret is readily available through public 
sources, all trade secret protection is lost. In contrast, the 
Restatement asserts that trade secret protection still exists as long 
as it is not actually “known” to competitors even if it is 
“knowable” through public sources.38 
On May 11, 2016, however, President Obama signed the 
Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (“DTSA”).39 This represented 
the first time that U.S. law would provide a federal private right of 
                                                                                                             
MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 20, at 35. 
34 Id. at 36. 
35 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1. At that time, Texas, New York, and 
Massachusetts had not adopted the UTSA, but as of September 1, 2013, Texas 
had signed the UTSA into law. 
36 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1948) (amended 
1985). 
37 See MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 20, at 46. 
38 Id.; see also Rohm & Haas Co. v. Adco Chem. Co., 689 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 
1982). 
39 See Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (amended 18 U.S.C. §§ 1832, 
1833, 1835, 1836, 1838, 1839, and 1961). 
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action exclusively for trade secret protection since the Economic 
Espionage Act of 1996. 
While its full use remains to be seen, the DTSA remains 
cautious regarding employer protection. The Act prohibits 
injunctions that “prevent a person from entering into an 
employment relationship,” and if “any conditions [are] placed on 
such employment,” it must be based on “evidence of threatened 
misappropriation,” not “merely on the information the person 
knows.”40 
As such, trade secrets have historically had a broad scope in the 
United States. “A trade secret can relate to technical matters, such 
as the composition or design of a product, a method of 
manufacture, or the know-how necessary to perform a particular 
operation or service. 41  A trade secret can also relate to other 
aspects of business operations such as pricing and marketing 
techniques or the identity and requirements of customers.”42 
However, there are still some limits. Courts have denied 
protection to common information or procedures, including 
recipes, cooking procedures for barbeque chicken43 and customer 
lists posted on a company website.44 
  
                                                                                                             
40 Id. 
41 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 42 cmt. f (1995). 
42 Id. 
43 In Buffets, Inc. v. Klinke, the Ninth Circuit held that “the detailed 
procedures of recipes were readily ascertainable” and “many of them were 
‘basic American dishes that are served in buffets across the United States.’” The 
court further held that “the recipes were for such American staples as BBQ 
chicken and macaroni and cheese and the procedures, while detailed, are 
undeniably obvious.” Therefore, they are not entitled to trade secret protection. 
See Buffets, Inc. v. Klinke, 73 F.3d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1996). 
44 Dawn Rudenko Albert, Trade Secrets in the United States, INTELL. ASSET 
MGMT. (July/Aug. 2010), http://www.iam-media.com/Magazine/Issue/42/ 
Management-report/Trade-secrets-in-the-United-States. 
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D.  The Enforceability of Non-Compete Agreements in U.S. 
Courts—From the Perspective of Protectable  
Business Interest 
 
U.S. courts first look for a “protectable business interest” in 
deciding whether to enforce a non-compete. A non-compete may 
be enforceable if the employer can identify a legitimate business 
interest. If the employer cannot demonstrate a legitimate business 
interest in need of protection by the non-compete, the agreement 
will not be enforceable in any respect.45 However, the line between 
protectable and unprotectable business interests is often indistinct. 
Today, trade secrets provide a necessary competitive advantage 
to employers. Courts, however, have differed on whether 
“confidential information” constitutes “protectable business 
interests” under non-competes. The Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts offers three examples of basic protectable interests: (1) 
the customer relationship or good will; (2) trade secrets or other 
confidential information; or (3) in the context of employment 
relationships, unique attributes or skills possessed by an 
employee.46 
Many states regard “confidential business information” and 
“customer relationships” as protectable business interest for non-
competes, some states also protect goodwill, extraordinary or 
specialized training, and employees’ unique or extraordinary 
services.47 Furthermore, lower courts have loosened common law 
standards by broadening the definition of protectable business 
interests of non-competes.48  In Ingersoll-Rand v. Ciavatti,49  the 
New Jersey Supreme Court held that an employer has a legitimate 
interest in protecting “highly specialized, current information not 
generally known in the industry, created and stimulated by the 
                                                                                                             
45 See, e.g., E.P.I. of Cleveland, Inc. v. Basler, 230 N.E.2d 552, 557 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1967). 
46 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmts. b, c (1981). 
47 See Russell Beck, Employee Noncompetes A State by State Survey, 
BECK REED RIDDEN, LLP (Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.beckreedriden.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/09/Noncompetes-50-State-Survey-Chart-20130814.pdf. 
48 Id. 
49 Ingersoll-Rand v. Ciavatti, 542 A.2d 879, 894 (N.J. 1988). 
11
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research environment furnished by the employer, to which the 
employee has been ‘exposed’ and ‘enriched’ solely due to his 
employment.” 50  A similar expansion occurred in employee 
education and training. In Borg-Warner Protective Services, Corp. 
v. Guardsmark, Inc., 51  a Kentucky district court recognized 
investments in generalized employee training as a legitimate 
business interest, substantially broadening the scope of information 
protected by non-competes.52 
While these two cases highlight the expansion of protectable 
business interests in the 1980s and 1990s, courts have recently 
started to narrow the scope of a protectable interest under non-
competes, 53  curtailing further expansion under a modern 
approach.54 In BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg,55 the Court of Appeals 
of New York scrutinized the legitimacy of any interest claimed by 
BDO under the common law standard and held that, unless a 
former employee uses confidential information to obtain clients, 
the employer’s interest is limited to the client relationships that the 
employer enabled the employee to acquire in the performance of 
his work.56 
It is difficult to say whether this trend is reflected throughout 
the U.S.; after all, Garrison only mentioned one example. In 2011, 
                                                                                                             
50 See Michael J. Garrison & John T. Wendt, The Evolving Law of 
Employee Noncompete Agreements: Recent Trends and an Alternative Policy 
Approach, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 107 (2008). 
51 Borg-Warner Protective Servs., Corp. v. Guardsmark, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 
495, 502 (E.D. Ky. 1996) (concluding that the employer had a legitimate interest 
in its investment of training and education in the guards, although neither 
employer interest in trade secrets or goodwill, nor close relationships from the 
guards with its customers existed); see also Garrison & Wendt, supra note 50. 
52 See Garrison & Wendt, supra note 50. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 712 N.E.2d 1220, 1226 (N.Y. 1999) 
(concluding that an employee’s status (a manager) in the firm was not based 
upon the uniqueness or extraordinary nature of the accounting services he 
generally performed on behalf of the firm, but mostly on his ability to attract a 
corporate clientele); see also Garrison & Wendt, supra note 50. 
56 BDO Seidman, 712 N.E.2d at 1225; see also Garrison & Wendt, supra 
note 50. 
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in Reliable Fire Equipment Company v. Arredondo,57 the Illinois 
Supreme Court found that a legitimate business interest is not 
limited to the two protectable interests identified in over thirty 
years of precedent: (1) near permanent customer relationships; and 
(2) trade secrets or confidential information. Instead, the court 
stated that enforceability is dependent on the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the employer’s legitimate business 
interest in a particular case. 58  Factors considered by the court 
included, but were not limited to, the near-permanence of customer 
relationships, the employee’s acquisition of confidential 
information through his or her employment, and time and place 
restrictions.59 
 
II. NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS FOR TRADE SECRET  
PROTECTION IN CHINA 
 
As an old Chinese proverb says, “when an apprentice learns the 
skill, his master will starve.” This proverb reflects the nature of 
competition between the apprentice and master in the self-
sufficient era before China’s Reform and Policies gradually 
changed this economic form. To avoid competition, masters chose 
apprentices carefully, considering their relationship (e.g., whether 
they were relatives), their ability to expand the market, the 
geographic area where an apprentice would work, and the 
likelihood of obedience to the master.60 Furthermore, the master 
would keep secret his or her most valuable skills and not teach 
them to the apprentice until the master completely trusted the 
apprentice.61 This principle is similar to the early forms of trade 
                                                                                                             
57 Reliable Fire Equip. Co. v. Arredondo, 965 N.E.2d 393, 403 (Ill. 2011). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Until the late 1980s, many areas of China, especially rural areas, heavily 
relied on the masters and apprentices who produced different kinds of products 
or tools for daily needs or farming. Houses were built by stonemasons, 
bricklayer and carpenters together, furniture was made by a carpenter or bamboo 
craftsman, or clothes were sewn by tailors. Master and apprentices travelled to 
different villages and to make products in the homes of the villagers. See 
HAILING SHAN, PROTECTION TRADE SECRETS IN CHINA 81 (1st ed. 2008). 
61 Id. 
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secret protection in England, where secrets were controlled 
exclusively within a family or a firm. 
 
A.  Overview of Non-Compete Agreements in China 
 
The concept of non-competes began to come to public attention 
in China in the early 1990s. When the Anti-Unfair Competition 
Law was issued in China in 1993, non-competes were not directly 
mentioned in the statutory language. However, Articles 2 and 10 of 
the Anti-Unfair Competition Law 62 were often quoted as the basis 
for non-compete cases regarding trade secret protection, well 
before the regulation or the act directly regulating non-competes 
was enacted. 
Non-competes were first directly mentioned in Opinions 
Regarding Mobility of Employee in Enterprises,63  a ministerial-
                                                                                                             
62 Article 2 states that “business operators shall abide by the principle of 
voluntariness, equality, impartiality, honesty and good faith, and also adhere to 
public commercial moral in their business transactions.” Article 10 provides: 
Business operators shall not use the following methods to 
infringe trade secret: (1) acquiring trade secret of another by 
theft, inducement, duress, or other illegal means; (2) 
disclosing, using, or allowing others to use trade secret of 
another acquired with the above illegal means; or (3) 
disclosing, using, or allowing others to use trade secret in 
breach of an agreement or a confidentiality obligation imposed 
by a legal owner. Any act of a third-party who acquires, uses, 
or discloses trade secrets that he knew or should have known 
to have been misappropriated in any of the aforementioned 
ways, shall be treated as the infringement of trade secret. 
Trade secret means any technical and business information 
that is unknown to the public, can bring economic benefits to 
the rights holder, has practical utility, and for which the trade 
secret owner has taken measures to maintain its 
confidentiality. 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fan Buzhengdang Jingzheng Fa (中华人民共和
国反不正当竞争法 ) [Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the PRC], NPC 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 2, 1993, 
effective Dec. 1, 1993), Sept. 2, 1993, available at 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2000-12/05/content_4600.htm (China).  
63 Guanyu Qiye Zhigong Liudong Ruogan Wenti De Tongzhi (关于企业职
工流动若干问题的通知 ) [Opinions Regarding Mobility of Employee in 
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level regulation issued by the Ministry of Labor in 1996. Article 2 
of the regulation states that an employer can require that an 
employee with knowledge of trade secrets not work in an 
enterprise in competition with the employer within three years 
after the expiration or termination of an employment contract, 
provided that the non-compete agreement is signed by, and a 
certain amount of compensation is given to, the employee.64 
To meet demands for trade secret protection from emerging 
high-tech or other technology companies, similar non-compete 
provisions developed in other ministerial-level or local government 
level regulations.65 
Aside from these low-level regulations by ministries or local 
governments,66  however, China had no uniform national statute 
governing non-competes before 2008. Nevertheless, in practice, 
employers commonly required key employees to enter into non-
competes, even before the national statute including non-compete 
provisions was enacted. Over time, the existence of non-competes 
began to conflict with other basic laws, such as contract law, which 
caused courts and the labor arbitration board to question non-
compete enforceability. In order to regulate non-competes, the 
National People’s Congress promulgated the Labor Contract 
Law, 67  effective January 1, 2008, and formally covered non-
                                                                                                             
Enterprises], WENKU (promulgated by the Ministry of Labor, 1996), available at 
http://wenku.baidu.com/view/6b8c6f2f647d27284b735109.html (China). 
64 Id. 
65 Examples include Opinions Regarding Strengthening Trade Secret 
Management in the Mobility of Technical Persons issued in 1997 by the 
National Science and Technology Committee and other regulations issued by 
local governments or local people’s congress, such as Trade Secret Protection 
Regulation for Shenzhen Special Economic Zone in 1996, Trade Secret 
Protection Regulation for Zhuhai Special Economic Zone in 1997, and 
Regulation for Zhongguancun Science Park in 2001. 
66 In China, State Council, ministries or agencies, provincial or some special 
local governments or local people’s congress have the authority to issue 
regulations. However, only National People’s Congress or its Standing 
Committee can enact national laws, such as the Contract Law, Anti-Unfair 
Competition Law, Labor Contract Law, and Supreme People’s Court has the 
authority to issue interpretations for the national laws. The three main sources of 
the Chinese legal system are laws, regulations, and interpretations. 
67 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Hetongfa (中华人民共和国劳
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competes in Articles 23 and 24: 
 
Article 23. An employer and an employee may 
include in their labor contract confidentiality 
provisions in respect of the employer’s trade secrets 
and other confidential matters with regard to 
intellectual property. 
 
If an employee has a confidentiality obligation, the 
employer may contract with the employee to 
include non-competition provisions in the labor 
contract or confidentiality agreement, and agree to 
pay financial compensation to the employee on a 
monthly basis during the non-competition period 
after the termination or revocation of the labor 
contract. If the employee breaches the non-
competition provisions, he shall pay liquidated 
damages to the employer in accordance with the 
stipulated terms. 
 
Article 24. The personnel subject to non-
competition obligations shall be only applied to the 
employer’s senior management, senior technicians 
and other individuals with confidentiality 
obligations. The scope, geographical limitations and 
term of the non-competition obligations shall be 
agreed upon by the employer and the employee, and 
such non-competition agreement shall not violate 
any laws and regulations.68 
 
After the revocation or termination of a labor 
contract, the non-competition period for any of the 
persons mentioned in the preceding paragraph in 
                                                                                                             
动合同法) [Labor Contract Law of the PRC] (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 29, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008) GOV.CN, art. 
23, June 29, 2007, available at http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2007-
06/29/content_669394.htm (China). 
68 Id. 
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terms of his working for a competing employer that 
produces or deals with the same type of products or 
engages in the same type of business, or in terms of 
his setting up his own business to produce or deal 
with the same type of products or to engage in the 
same type of business, shall not exceed two years.69 
 
These articles describe the major elements of non-competition: 
(1) an employment agreement may include non-compete 
provisions intended to protect trade secrets and other confidential 
matters of an employer; 70  (2) the non-compete shall only be 
applied to senior management, senior technicians, and other 
individuals with confidentiality obligations; 71  (3) restrictions on 
business scope, geographic area, and duration shall be reasonable 
and agreed upon by each other, and the duration shall not exceed 
two years; (4) an employer must pay reasonable compensation to 
the employee on a monthly basis throughout the duration of the 
term of the non-compete;72 and (5) if the employee breaches the 
non-compete, the employee shall pay the employer the damages 
agreed upon in the contract.73 
  
                                                                                                             
69 See Labor Contract Law of the PRC, supra note 67. 
70 It is arguable whether the trade secrets and other confidential matters of 
the employer is the protectable business interest for the non-compete. This topic 
will be discussed later. 
71 Some courts have included senior sales staffs in this category, while 
blanket agreements that apply to all employees are invalid. 
72 There is no definition of “reasonable compensation” in Labor Contract 
Law, but according to the judicial interpretations in 2013 by the Supreme 
People’s Court of China, an employer who can pay thirty percent of an 
employee’s annual salary every year might be considered reasonable 
compensation. 
73 See Dan Harris, Employee Non-Compete Agreements In China. It’s 
Complicated, CHINA LAW BLOG (Jan. 20, 2010), http://www.chinalawblog.com/ 
2010/01/employee_noncompete_agreements.html. 
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B.  Overview of Trade Secret Law in China 
 
Unlike in the U.S., where the UTSA has been adopted in 
almost every state, there is no uniform trade secret law in China. 
China’s governance of trade secrets is guided by scattered laws and 
regulations. Of these statutes, the most significant is the Anti-
Unfair Competition Law,74  supplemented by case law from the 
Supreme People’s Court. 75  Additionally, other laws such as 
contract law, company law, and criminal law have some provisions 
that can govern trade secret issues in special circumstances 
accordingly. 
The Anti-Unfair Competition Law, enacted in 1993, defines 
trade secrets in Article 10 as “technical and business information 
that is unknown to the public, can bring economic benefits to the 
rights holder, has practical utility, and for which the trade secret 
owner has taken measures to maintain its confidentiality.”76 Article 
10 further prescribes three forms of trade secret misappropriation: 
(1) acquiring trade secret of another by theft, inducement, duress, 
or other illegal means; (2) disclosing, using, or allowing others to 
use the trade secrets of another acquired with the above illegal 
means; or (3) disclosing, using, or allowing others to use trade 
secrets in breach of an agreement or a confidentiality obligation 
imposed by a legal owner.77 
In January 2007, the Supreme People’s Court issued a Judicial 
Interpretation on Certain Issues Concerning the Application of 
Law in Trials of Civil Cases Involving Unfair Competition, which 
touched upon issues of trade secret protection.78 The Interpretation 
                                                                                                             
74 See Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the PRC, supra note 62. 
75 Strictly speaking, in a narrow sense, the interpretation (“Judicial 
Interpretation”) by the Supreme People’s Court is not the law. Only the statute 
enacted by National People’s Congress or its standing committee can be named 
as the “law” in China. However, the Judicial Interpretation is very useful and 
practical for the lower courts when hearing cases because Judicial Interpretation 
provides courts the detailed interpretations of the laws. Over time, Judicial 
Interpretation has become regarded by courts as one of the three main binding 
sources, apart from statutes and regulations. 
76 See Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the PRC, supra note 62. 
77 Id. 
78 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Buzhengdang Jingzheng Minshi 
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provided a detailed explanation of the meaning of “unknown to the 
public,” “economic benefits and practical utility,” and 
“confidentiality measures.” 79  It also clarified its definition for 
controversial types of information, including the types of customer 
lists which could be recognized as trade secrets. The Interpretation 
made it clear that customer lists could be protected as trade secrets 
so long as they met the statutory requirements.80 Customer lists 
contain names, addresses, contact information, business patterns, 
and business plans that are distinguishable from public information 
and constitute specific customer information; they also include the 
compilations of the names of general customers, and specific 
customers with a long-term business relationship.81 
Another important regulation concerning trade secret 
protection is Provisions Regarding the Prohibition of Trade Secret 
Infringement, which is the ministerial level of regulation issued by 
the State Administration of Industry and Commerce (“SAIC”).82 It 
describes administrative procedures for handling trade secret cases 
and gives branch offices of SAIC power to investigate trade secret 
misappropriation acts.83 
Contract law also provides special trade secret protection in 
contract negotiations; 84  company law stipulates trade secrets 
                                                                                                             
Anjian Yingyong Falv Ruogan Wenti De Jieshi (最高人民法院关于审理不正
当竞争民事案件应用法律若干问题的解释 ] [Interpretation of Supreme 
People’s Court on Some Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial 
of Civil Cases Involving Unfair Competition], WIPO (Sup. People’s Ct., Feb. 1, 
2007), available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/zh/details.jsp?id=6558 (China). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Guojia Gongshang Xingzheng Guanli Ju Guanyu Jinzhi Qinfan Shangye 
Mimi Xingwei De Ruogan Guiding (国家工商行政管理局关于禁止侵犯商业
秘密行为的若干规定) [Several Provisions on Prohibiting Infringements upon 
Trade Secrets] (promulgated by the State Admin. for Indus. & Com. of the PRC, 
Nov. 23, 1995, effective Nov. 23, 1995), available at 
http://www.people.com.cn/zixun/flfgk/item/dwjjf/falv/7/7-5-08.html (China). 
83 Id. 
84 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Hetong Fa (中华人民共和国合同法) 
[Contract Law of the PRC] (promulgated by the Nat’1 People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 
1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999), art. 43, available at 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2000-12/06/content_4732.htm (China). 
19
Shangguan: A Comparative Study of Non-Compete Agreements for Trade Secret Pr
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2016
424  WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 11:5 
 
obligations for senior management;85  and criminal law provides 
criminal action for trade secrets cases.86 87 
 
C.  The Enforceability of the Non-Compete Agreement in the Court 
of China—From the Perspective of Protectable  
Business Interests 
 
An employer must have a legitimate business interest for a 
non-compete to be valid. In the absence of a legitimate business 
interest, there are no grounds to justify constraints on an 
employee’s occupational liberty. According to a provision of 
Article 23 in the Chinese Labor Contract Law, section 1, an 
employer and an employee may include in their labor contract 
confidentiality provisions regarding an employer’s intellectual 
property. Section 2 provides that an employer may enter into a 
non-compete with an employee, but does not specifically mention 
“protectable business interests.” 88  This issue has been a huge 
source of controversy, as courts are divided over whether the term 
“protectable business interest” only encompasses a “trade secret” 
or includes both “trade secrets” and “other confidential matters 
with regard to intellectual property.”89 
                                                                                                             
85 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi Fa (中华人民共和国公司法) 
[Company Law of the PRC] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’1 
People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006), art. 149(7), available at 
http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2005-10/28/content_85478.htm (China). 
86 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa (中华人民共和国刑法 ) 
[Criminal Law of the PRC] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar., 14, 
1997, effective Oct. 1, 1997), art. 219, available at 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2000-12/17/content_5004680.htm 
(China). 
87 See generally J. Benjamin Bai & Guoping Da, Strategies for Trade 
Secrets Protection in China, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 357 (2011). 
88 See Labor Contract Law of the PRC, supra note 67. 
89 Although Labor Contract Law mentioned both “trade secret” and 
“confidential information,” the definition of these two concepts is not 
determined therein. “Trade secret” is defined in Anti-Unfair Competition Law 
and subsequent Judicial Interpretation, while “confidential information” has no 
specific provision. Some kinds of confidential information can be regarded as 
“trade secret” if they meet certain requirements of trade secret. For example, for 
customer lists to be trade secrets, they must be customers’ names, addresses, 
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Two judicial viewpoints have emerged. The first is that the 
scope of a protectable business interest extends to not only trade 
secrets, but also other confidential matters. The second contends 
that the validity of a given non-compete should be subject to 
whether a trade secret is at issue.90 
While the Supreme People’s Court remains silent, lower courts 
have been split on the issue. According to research by Judge Tao 
Gu,91 a majority of courts support the second view that validity of 
a non-compete depends on the existence of an actual trade secret.92  
Judge Gu lists several examples to support this narrower 
interpretation, including a decision from the Higher People’s Court 
of Beijing Municipality, which held that “the existence of 
protectable interest—that is, the trade secret—is the precondition 
to the validity of a non-compete, and that a non-compete cannot 
exist if there is no trade secret protection.”93 The Higher People’s 
Court of Zhejiang Province also held that “[a] non-compete must 
have a reasonable purpose and cannot violate laws, regulations or 
                                                                                                             
contacts, habits, purpose and content of transactions; and such information must 
be special and independent from the generally known information by the public. 
Generally, confidential information can be defined by the parties in the contract 
and supported by Chinese law. For example, Section 2 of Article 60 of Contract 
Law states that “the parties shall abide by the principle of good faith, and 
perform obligations such as notification, assistance, and confidentiality, etc. in 
light of the nature and purpose of the contract and in accordance with the 
relevant usage.” Labor Contract Law of the PRC, supra note 67. 
90 See Tao Gu, Lun Qinfan Shangye Mimi Jiufen Zhong Youguan Jingye 
Xianzhi De Ruogan Falv Wenti (论侵犯商业秘密纠纷中有关竞业限制的若干
法律问题) [Study of Non-Compete Issues for Trade Secret Infringement], 5 J.L. 
APPLICATION (法律适用) 58 (2013) (China). 
91 Mr. Tao Gu is a senior judge and Vice Director working at the IP 
Division of Higher People’s Court of Jiangsu Province. He accumulated rich 
trial experience in the area of trade secret infringement and published an article 
named Study of Non-Compete Issues for Trade Secret Infringement. 
92 See Gu, supra note 90. 
93 See Beijing Gaoyuan Minsanting Guanyu Beijingshi Fayuan Shenli 
Buzhengdang Jingzheng Jiufen Anjian De Jiben Qingkuang Ji Zhuyao Zuofa (北
京高院民三庭关于《北京市法院审理不正当竞争纠纷案件的基本情况及主
要做法》) [No. 3 Civil Division of People’s Court of Beijing Municipality 
Regarding the Basic Information and Practices for Hearing the Anti-Unfair 
Competition Cases by the courts of Beijing] (unpublished) (on file with author) 
(China); see also Gu, supra note 90. 
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the public interest; the purpose of a non-compete is to protect the 
trade secrets of the employer, rather than restricting competition 
under the guise of a non-compete.” 94  Furthermore, the Higher 
People’s Court of Shandong Province also held that “[a] non-
compete shall be targeted to the necessary persons and with the 
necessity of protecting the employer’s trade secrets.” 95  The 
Supreme People’s Court indirectly expressed judicial policy, 
however, when it held that “as to the case where neither a trade 
secret exists, nor is a competitive field in the industry restricted by 
a non-compete, the lower courts need to balance the relationship 
between free competition and freedom to choose employers, and 
the relationship between the non-compete obligation and employee 
mobility; and courts cannot recklessly make the decision of 
constituting anti-unfair competition simply on grounds of 
diminishing certain advantages to the competition.” 96  Such a 
                                                                                                             
94 See Zhejiang Gaoyuan Minsanting Guanyu Shangye Mimi Sifa Baohu 
Wenti De Diaoyan Baogao (浙江高院民三庭关于《商业秘密司法保护问题的
调研报告》) [No. 3 Civil Division of People’s Court of Zhejiang Province 
regarding the Research Report for the Issues of Trade Secret Judicial Protection] 
(unpublished) (on file with author) (China); see also Gu, supra note 90. 
95 See Shandong Gaoyuan Minsanting Guanyu Shangye Mimi Sifa Baohu 
Wenti De Diaoyan Qingkuang Baogao (山东高院民三庭关于《商业秘密司法
保护问题的调研情况报告》) [No. 3 Civil Division of People’s Court of 
Shandong Province regarding the Research Information Report for the Issues of 
Trade Secret Judicial Protection] (unpublished) (on file with author) (China); see 
also Gu, supra note 90. 
96  See Xiaoming Xi, Chongfen Fahui Sifa Baohu Zhishi Chanquan Zhudao 
Zuoyong Wei Shijian Kexue Fazhanguan He Jianshe Chuangxinxing Guojia 
Tigong Jianqiang Youlide Sifa Baozhang—Zai Quanguo Fayuan Zhishi 
Chanquan Shenpan Gongzuo Zuotanhui Ji Zhishi Chanquan Shenpan Gongzuo 
Xianjin Jiti He Xianjin Geren Biaozhang Dahui Shang De Jianghua (《充分发
挥司法保护知识产权主导作用为实践科学发展观和建设创新型国家提供坚
强有力的司法保障——在全国法院知识产权审判工作座谈会暨知识产权审
判工作先进集体和先进个人表障大会上的讲话》) [Fully Play the Main Role 
of the Judicial Protection for Intellectual Property so as to Provide the Robust 
Judicial Safeguard for Practicing the Theory of Scientific Development and 
Building the Innovation Country – the Speech on the Symposium for the 
Intellectual Property Case Hearing and the Awards Ceremony for the 
Individuals and Units of the Intellectual Property Hearing], CHINACOURT (Feb. 
5, 2009), available at http://gxfy.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=6032; see 
also Gu, supra note 90. 
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narrow interpretation reflects the attitude of the majority of courts 
which have decided non-competition cases—namely, that a court’s 
core function is to balance employee mobility and the rights of 
employers in the context of economic development and social 
stability. 
Another example of the cautious attitude of the Supreme 
People’s Court is a general opinion called the Guidance of Case 
Trial on Employment Dispute under Current Situation. Article 10 
of the opinion stipulates that: 
 
[W]hen hearing the noncompetition cases, the 
courts shall (1) take into full account the actual 
level of the economy and technology development 
in our country; (2) based on the public interests, not 
only maintain fair competition in the socialist 
market economy, but also balance the interests of 
different market players; (3) avoid limiting the 
employee’s freedom of career choice through the 
inappropriate expansion of the scope of non-
competition; and (4) protect employers’ trade 
secrets and other legal rights, so as to fulfill the 
legislative intent and purpose of the noncompetitive 
legal system to the full extent.97 
 
Although the opinion of the Supreme People’s Court provides only 
the general policy with which courts must comply, it still reflects a 
cautious attitude towards the expansion of non-competes. 
Two cases have provided examples of how courts have 
determined protectable business interests. In Rao Haibo v. Beijing 
New Giant Training School,98 Rao Haibo, a former vice-president 
                                                                                                             
97 Guanyu Dangqian Xingshixia Zuohao Laodong Zhengyi Jiufen Anjian 
Shenpan Gongzuode Zhidao Yijian (关于当前形势下做好劳动争议纠纷案件
审判工作的指导意见) [Guidance of Case Trial on Employment Dispute Under 
Current Situation] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., 2009), available at 
http://law.chinalawinfo.com/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=lawexplanation&Gid=1090
523960 (China). 
98 See Rao Haibo Su Beijingshi Haidianqu Xinjuren Peixun Xuexiao (饶海
波诉北京市海淀区新巨人培训学校 ) [Rao Haibo v. Beijing New Giant 
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in charge of the textbook research center of New Giant Training 
School, appealed from a judgment holding that Rao Haibo violated 
the non-compete and had to pay damages. Rao Haibo raised 
several affirmative defenses, one of which was that New Giant is a 
private and non-enterprise school and belongs to the non-profit 
service organization, and as such could have no trade secrets. The 
court held that, although the defendant is a private and non-
enterprise school, the Labor Contract Law didn’t exclude such 
schools from the application of non-compete provisions; and that 
Rao Haibo could be regarded as a person governed by a non-
compete because he knew and had access to New Giant’s training, 
skills, and related information. The court further held that, in the 
education-training field, a teacher’s training ability and business 
information constitutes the essential competitiveness for the 
education-training school, and such skills and information could be 
protected as trade secrets. Based on this ruling, the appellate court 
affirmed the district court’s decision.99 
In Lin Zhenxian v. Shiyu Product Logo (Suzhou) Co. 
(“Company”), 100  the appellant, Lin Zhenxian, appealed to the 
Higher People’s Court of Jiangsu Province, from a judgment that 
he had violated a non-compete because he worked at another 
competitive company within the period forbidden by his non-
compete and used a book containing trade secrets without 
authorization from his former employer. Lin Zhenxian made 
several affirmative defenses, including the fact that the book’s 
content could already be found in the public domain and 
accordingly did not qualify as a trade secret. 
In deciding whether the book constituted a protectable interest 
under the non-compete provision of the Labor Contract Law, the 
appellate court quoted the definition of trade secrets from Article 
                                                                                                             
Training School] 2015 NO. 1 FINAL CIVIL TRIAL NO. 02737], PKULAW (Beijing 
No. 1 Interm. People’s Ct. 2015), available at http://www.pkulaw.cn/case/ 
pfnl_121768328.html (China). 
99 Id. 
100 See Lin Zhenxian Su Shiyu Chanpin Biaozhi (Suzhou) Youxian Gongsi 
(林镇贤诉世誉产品标识(苏州)有限公司) [Lin Zhenxian v. Shiyu Product 
Logo (Suzhou) Co.], (Jiangsu High People’s Ct. 2008); see also Gu, supra note 
90. 
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10 of the Anti-Unfair Competition Law. The court held that 
“unknown to the public” means the information—whether as a 
whole or as the specific construction or combination for each 
part—is not known to the persons who often access this kind of 
information in this field and is not easily obtained. However, Lin 
Zhenxian had spent time, effort, and money analyzing factors 
contributing to defect products in different manufacturing 
processes and had filled the book with associated solutions. For 
this reason, the book contained valuable technical information that 
could not be obtained through public channels and would have 
brought the Company a competitive advantage and economic 
value. As such, the technical information mentioned in the book 
could be protected by law as a trade secret.101 
 
III. COMPARISONS: DIFFERENCES OF NON-COMPETES IN THE  
U.S. & CHINA 
 
A.  U.S. Courts Are Cautious to Non-Competes  
 
In the U.S., enforceability of non-competes varies from state to 
state. While a few states prohibit non-competes altogether, most 
states follow the reasonableness test in deciding whether a non-
compete is enforceable. Generally, courts have construed non-
competes narrowly, presuming that they are invalid and 
enforceable only upon proof that such contracts are reasonably 
necessary for the protection of an employer’s business interest.102 
A non-compete must reasonably limit the breadth of its subject 
matter, the duration, and the geographic area in which former 
employees can compete.103 
  
                                                                                                             
101 See Lin Zhenxian v. Shiyu Chanpin Biaozhi (Suzhou) Co., supra note 
100. 
102 See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED 
STATE DOCTRINES 118 (5th ed. 2004). 
103 Id. 
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B.  Courts in China Have a Tendency to Support Non-Competes 
 
To evaluate the general attitude in Chinese courts towards non-
competes, this Article analyzes all final judgments on non-compete 
cases decided by intermediate or higher courts104 from March 2014 
to February 2015.105 Thirty-six of these cases were related to the 
validity of the non-compete; twenty-four of which were regarded 
by courts as “valid and enforceable.” In other words, two out of 
three non-compete cases were held to be “valid and enforceable” 
by Chinese courts.106 
 
C.  Different Focus and Emphasis on the Non-Compete by Courts 
in the U.S. & China When Deciding Its Enforceability 
 
Traditionally, non-competes arose out of the need to protect 
trade secrets and other valuable business information. Over time, 
courts in England and the U.S. gradually began to enforce non-
competes. Modern U.S. courts view the protectable business 
interest as a requisite element needed to enforce non-competes. 
In Modern Environments v. Stinnett,107 Stinnett, a salesperson 
for Modern, signed an employment agreement with Modern 
containing a one-year non-compete clause. Within one year, 
Stinnett accepted employment with a company which competed 
with Modern. Modern notified Stinnett and her new employer by 
letter that Stinnett’s employment with the competitor violated the 
non-compete clause. 108  Soon afterwards, Stinnett filed a 
declaratory judgment action to establish that the non-compete in 
                                                                                                             
104 In China, common labor cases are filed in the basic people’s court and 
appealed to the intermediate court when necessary. Very few cases are granted 
certiorari by the provincial higher court. Trade secret infringement cases, on the 
other hand, are filed in the intermediate court and appealed to the higher court in 
different provinces. 
105 Since January 1, 2014, all cases decided by all levels of courts in China 
have been publicized and can be found on the website of Judicial Opinions of 
China established by Supreme People’s Court at 
http://www.court.gov.cn/zgcpwsw/. 
106 See infra Appendix. 
107 Modern Env’ts v. Stinnett, 561 S.E.2d 694 (Va. 2002). 
108 Id. 
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question was overbroad and unenforceable. The Virginia Supreme 
Court affirmed the trial court’s decision that the non-compete was 
unenforceable because the defendant failed to present evidence of 
any protectable business interest served by prohibiting Stinnett 
from being employed in any capacity by a competing company.109 
Similarly, in Reliable Fire Equipment Company v. 
Arredondo,110 the Illinois Supreme Court looked at employee non-
competes under the three-prong rule of reasonableness where the 
legitimate business interest of the employer is a long-established 
component.111 In this case, the lower courts had held that non-
competes were not enforceable where the employer had failed to 
prove the existence of a legitimate business interest that justified 
enforcement. Although the Illinois Supreme Court overruled and 
rejected the appellate court’s verdict, which limited the “legitimate 
protectable interests” to either “near-permanent” customer 
relationships or confidential information, the Court held that the 
“legitimate business interest” precedent remains intact, but only as 
a non-conclusive example of applying the legitimate business 
interest.112 
By contrast, the enforceability of non-competes in China 
generally depends on whether employers compensated departing 
employees reasonably. In the analysis of the thirty-six non-
compete cases,113 only twelve were held invalid. Nine were held 
invalid due to the employer’s failure to pay reasonable 
compensation according to the employment contracts or Labor 
Contract Law. Only three cases were invalid based on a lack of 
legitimate business information or findings that employers had 
failed to provide evidence that employees actually accessed the 
trade secrets in question.114 
                                                                                                             
109 Id. at 695. 
110 Reliable Fire Equip. Co. v. Arredondo, 965 N.E.2d 393 (Ill. 2011). 
111 Id. at 400. 
112 Id.; see also KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP, Kirkland Alert: New Illinois 
Supreme Court Decision Requires Detailed Analysis of Restrictive Covenants, 
KIRKLAND.COM (Dec. 2011), http://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/Publications/ 
Alert_121611.pdf. 
113 See infra Appendix. 
114 These three cases are (1) Jiangsu Niupai Fangzhi Jixie Youxian Gongsi 
Su Zou Daoyong (江苏牛牌纺织机械有限公司诉邹道勇) [Jiangsu Niupai 
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The following court structure in China may provide an 
explanation as to the reason that the judges have focused more on 
economic compensation rather than on protectable business 
interests in non-compete cases.  Courts in China, especially in the 
intermediate or high courts, have different divisions to hear 
different types of cases. These divisions include the civil, criminal, 
administrative, and intellectual property divisions, among others. 
Usually, the civil division of the court decides non-compete cases 
because such cases belong to the category of labor law cases, 
which falls in the domain of the civil division, while the 
intellectual property division of the court decides trade secret 
infringement cases. As a result, when trade secret cases fall to the 
intellectual property division, a judge specializing in intellectual 
property decides whether the information constitutes a trade secret. 
By comparison, civil division judges are generally not well-versed 
enough in intellectual property law to decide trade secret issues.115 
Another practical reason may be that the protectable business 
interest is not the key issue for the parties. Unlike the U.S. where 
the employer usually files non-compete claims, in China, both the 
employer and the employee may file for non-compete claims—
usually disputing compensation. As such, courts often consider 
compensation first, and only make a limited examination as to 
                                                                                                             
Textile Mach. Co. v. Zhou Daoyong], PKULAW (Yangzhou Interm. People’s Ct. 
2014), available at http://fjlx.pkulaw.cn/Case/pfnl_121476260.html? 
match=Exact; (2) Chongqing Suotong Chuguo Qihua Youxian Gongsi Su Liu 
Ying (重庆索通出国企划有限公司诉刘影) [Chongqing Suotong Chuguo 
Planning Co. v. Liu Ying], OPENLAW (Chongqing No. 5 Interm. People’s Ct. 
2014), available at http://openlaw.cn/judgement/98ce438f53de436 
bad87dda8c8bd436e; and (3) Guangdong Jixian Dianlan Fujian Youxian Gongsi 
Su Zhang Jinmei (广东吉熙安电缆附件有限公司诉张金梅) [Guangdong 
Jixian Cable Accessory Co. v. Zhang Jinmei], PKULAW (Fushan Interm. 
People’s Ct. 2014), available at http://www.pkulaw.cn/case/pfnl_ 
120588231.html?match=Exact (China). 
115 See Feng Yan & Liquan Huang, Shilun Jingye Xianzhi Xieyi Yu 
Shangye Mimi Zai Shenpan Shiwuzhong De Guanxi (试论竞业限制协议与商
业秘密在审判实务中的关系) [Study of the Relationship of the Non-Compete 
Agreement and Trade Secret in the Practice of Hearing], JINAN LICHENG 
DISTRICT COURT (May 6, 2014), available at http://jnanlcqfy.sdcourt.gov.cn/ 
jnanlcqfy/379762/379695/569552/index.html. 
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whether a legitimate business interest exists.116 
 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
A comparison of the non-compete systems used in the U.S. and 
China show that non-competes have been as explored in China as 
in the United States. Non-competes are, however, more easily 
supported by Chinese courts, despite the fact that the non-compete 
provision has been statutory law in China for less than ten years. In 
the thirty-six cases discussed, Chinese courts paid less attention to 
the analysis of “protectable business interest[s]” in non-compete 
cases. In so doing, they diverge from the real purpose of a non-
compete, which is to protect trade secrets. The current over-
enforcement of non-competes in China jeopardizes the balance 
between trade secret protection and employee mobility. 
 
A.  Create a Statutory Definition of “Protectable  
Business Interest” 
 
A statutory definition of the “protectable business interest” 
should be added to the Labor Contract Law or any future laws 
specific to governing trade secrets. While Article 23 and 24 of 
Labor Contract Law currently govern non-competes, these 
provisions do not specifically mention what constitutes a 
protectable business interest. 
In order to solve this problem and provide guidelines for the 
judges, two solutions are possible. The first is to have the Labor 
Contract Law amended by the National Congress, or to have a 
judicial interpretation regarding this matter issued by the Supreme 
People’s Court. Either would provide clear guidance for the courts 
in China; however, issuing the judicial interpretation is more 
practical and much simpler when compared to the time-consuming 
legislative process. For example, the pertinent part of Article 23 
could be amended or interpreted (as the case may be) as follows: 
“an employer and an employee may include in their labor contract 
the non-compete provision which protects an employer’s 
                                                                                                             
116 Id. 
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reasonable legitimate business interests.” If possible, the 
protectable business interest should be explicitly defined with 
language such as: the protectable business interest shall be defined 
to include trade secrets, customer lists, specific customer 
relationships, and other confidential matters with regard to 
intellectual property. As a “catch all” clause, this would be 
narrowly construed and only adopted in exceptional circumstances. 
The second solution would be to enact a national trade secret 
law, creating separate provisions for non-competes. Until now, 
most trade secret-related cases have relied on Article 10 of Anti-
Unfair Competition Law and the related Judicial Interpretations.117 
If the trade secret law were to be enacted, it may be advisable to 
have a separate section to delineate the non-compete in order to 
ensure that the precondition for a non-compete is the existence of a 
“protectable business interest,” and to define the “protectable 
business interest.” 
 
B.  Narrow the Validity of Non-Compete Agreements 
 
The high rate of enforceability in China may jeopardize the 
balance between trade secret protection and employee mobility, 
which may in turn affect the spread of technology inside the 
country. From the thirty-six cases previously analyzed, courts in 
China paid the most attention to economic compensation rather 
than restrictions such as specific employees, duration, geographic 
scope, and the competitiveness of the industry. As a result, two-
thirds of non-compete cases have recently been found valid by 
Chinese courts. 
In the U.S., there is a tendency to limit the enforceability of the 
non-compete in order to encourage innovation and create a 
welcoming environment for technical talents.118 By learning from 
the successful experiences of Silicon Valley in California and 
avoiding the lesson of Route 128 in Massachusetts, some states 
began to consider creating an employee-friendly non-compete 
                                                                                                             
117 See Interpretation of Supreme People’s Court on Some Issues 
Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Civil Cases Involving Unfair 
Competition, supra note 78. 
118 See Gomulkiewicz, supra note 5. 
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legal system, and several states even began to consider banning 
non-competes altogether.119 
China is currently transitioning from a traditional economy to a 
technology-motivated economy. Therefore, in order to balance 
employee mobility and trade secret protection, China should 
facilitate knowledge dissemination to better meet the demands of 
economic development. In a word, Chinese courts should narrow 
the validity of the non-compete. 
CONCLUSION 
 
This Article provides a comparison of the ways in which legal 
systems in both the U.S. and China have historically considered 
non-competes and trade secret protection. Compared to the 
cautious attitude to non-competes exhibited in the U.S., Chinese 
courts have a far stronger tendency to support non-competes. In 
addition, this Article provides an explanation for such strong 
enforceability of non-competes by analyzing non-compete cases: 
courts in China focus more on economic compensation and less on 
protectable business interests. However, in the context of economic 
transformation in China, the technology-driven economy plays an 
increasingly important role in China. Therefore, it is the right time 
for legislators and the courts in China to reexamine the non-
compete legal regime to assure that it does not hold back employee 
mobility and technology dissemination. 
 
PRACTICE POINTERS 
 
 In the U.S., courts are often cautious in non-compete cases, 
and decide an agreement’s enforceability based on the 
“reasonableness” standard, where a protectable business 
interest is merely one of many important factors to consider. 
 In China, courts focus more on economic compensation, 
which is easily satisfied by employers, and less on the 
factor of protectable business interests, which no exact 
statutory provisions govern. As such, they have a tendency 
to support non-competes. 
                                                                                                             
119 Id. 
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APPENDIX 
 
No. Case Name Validity 
1 [杨高翔诉现代金融控股(成都)有限公司上海分公司]] 
[Yang Gaoxiang v. Shanghai Branch of Xiandai Financial 
Holdings (Chengdu) Co.] (Shanghai No. 1 Interm. 
People’s Court, 2014)  
Invalid (no 
compensation) 
2 广州天玑房地产咨询服务有限公司诉何体秀
[Guanzhou Tianji Real Estate Consulting Service Co. v. 
He Tixiu] (Guangzhou Interm. People’s Court, 2014) 
Invalid (no 
compensation) 
3 许绍婷诉合肥锦雯言语康复中心[Xu Shaoting v. Hefei 
Jinwen Language Rehabilitation Centre] (Hefei Interm. 
People’s Court, 2014) 
Invalid (no 
compensation) 
4 浙江海纳电气有限公司诉周峰[Zhejiang Haina Electric 
Co. v. Zhou feng] (Wenzhou Interm. People’s Court, 
2014) 
Invalid (no 
compensation) 
5 南京东方明珠化工有限公司诉戴维维[Nanjing Oriental 
Pearl Chemical Engineering Co. v. Dai Weiwei] (Nanjing 
Interm. People’s Court, 2014) 
Invalid (no 
compensation) 
6 广州希创旺思电子科技有限公司诉郑浩荣[Guangzhou 
Xichuang Wangsi Electronic Technology Co. v. Zheng 
Haorong] (Guangzhou Interm. People’s Court, 2014) 
Invalid (no 
compensation) 
7 广州启圆钢材加工有限公司诉温建营 [Guangzhou 
Qiyuan Steel Processing Co. v. Wen Jianying] 
(Guangzhou Interm. People’s Court, 2014) 
Invalid (no 
compensation) 
8 广州番禺上海三菱电梯特约销售服务有限公司诉夏国
红 [Guangzhou Fanyu Shanghai Mitsubishi Elevators 
Sales & Service Co. v. Xia Guohong] (Guangzhou Interm. 
People’s Court, 2014) 
Invalid (no 
compensation) 
9 湖北省赵李桥茶厂有限责任公司诉任志刚 [Hubei 
Zhaoliqiao Tea Factory Co. v. Ren Zhigang] (Xianning 
Interm. People’s Court, 2014) 
Invalid (no 
compensation) 
10 江苏牛牌纺织机械有限公司诉邹道勇[Jiangsu Niupai 
Textile Machinery Co. v. Zhou Daoyong] (Yangzhou 
Interm. People’s Court, 2014) 
Invalid (no 
access to trade 
secret) 
11 重庆索通出国企划有限公司诉刘影 [Chongqing 
Suotong Chuguo Planning Co. v. Liu Ying] (Chongqing 
No. 5 Interm. People’s Court, 2014) 
Invalid (no 
access to trade 
secret) 
12 广东吉熙安电缆附件有限公司诉张金梅 [Guangdong 
Jixian Cable Accessory Co. v. Zhang Jinmei] (Fushan 
Interm. People’s Court, 2014) 
Invalid (no 
trade secret 
infringement) 
13 饶海波与北京市海淀区新巨人培训学校[Rao Haibo v. Valid 
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Beijing New Giant Training School] (Beijing No. 1 Interm. 
People’s Court, 2015). 
14 陈文飞诉上海宇昂水性新材料科技股份有限公司
[Chen Wenfei v. Shanghai Yuyang Shuixing New Material 
Technology Corp.] (Shanghai No. 1 Interm. People’s 
Court, 2015) 
Valid 
15 黄迅雷诉杭州网泰信息技术有限公司[Huang Xunlei v. 
Hangzhou Wangtai Information Technology Co.] 
(Hangzhou Interm. People’s Court, 2014) 
Valid 
16 胡银华诉上海比迪工业铝型材配件有限公司 [Hu 
Yinhua v. B&D Shanghai Aluminum Industrial Profiles & 
Accessories Co.] (Shanghai No. 1 Interm. People’s Court, 
2014) 
Valid 
17 纪向东诉北京东方惠尔图像技术有限公司  [Ji 
Xiangdong v. Beijing Dongfang Huier Image Technology 
Co.] (Beijing No. 1 Interm. People’s Court, 2014) 
Valid 
18 陈福泰诉上海回天新材料有限公司 [Chen Futai v. 
Shanghai Huitian New Material Co.] (Shanghai No. 1 
Interm. People’s Court, 2014) 
Valid 
19 陈科萍诉浙江信互贷电子商务有限公司[Chen Keping 
v. Zhejiang Xinhudai Electric Commerce Co.] (Hangzhou 
Interm. People’s Court, 2014) 
Valid 
20 软 岛 科 技 ( 重 庆 ) 有 限 公 司 诉 陈 文 [Ruandao 
Tecknology(Chongqing) Co. v. Chen Wen] (Chongqing 
No. 5 Interm. People’s Court, 2014) 
Valid 
21 威士伯 (上海 )企业管理有限公司诉范熠侃 [Valspar 
(Shanghai) Management Co. v. Fan Yikan] (Shanghai No. 
1 Interm. People’s Court) 
Valid 
22 盖洪涛诉山东南山科学技术研究院[Gai Hongtao v. 
Shandong Nanshan Scientific Technology Research 
Institute] (Yantai Interm. People’s Court, 2014) 
Valid 
23 孔玲丽诉上海易佩司国际物流有限公司[Kong Lingli v. 
Shanghai Yipeisi International Logistics Co.] (Shanghai 
No. 1 Interm. People’s Court) 
Valid 
24 李义栋诉连云港市金荷纸业包装有限公司[Li Yidong v. 
Lianyungang Jinhe Paper Packing Co.] (Lianyungang 
Interm. People’s Court, 2014) 
Valid 
25 陆洲诉湖北爱康大通汽车销售服务有限公司[Luzhou 
v. Hubei Aikang Datong Auto Sales & Service Co.] 
(Xiaogan Interm. People’s Court, 2014) 
Valid 
26 马忠仁诉济南鲁发环保科技有限公司[Ma Zhongren v. 
Jinan Lufa Environmental Protection Technology Co.] 
(Jinan Interm. People’s Court, 2014) 
Valid 
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27 秦洪格诉北京神州在线科技有限公司[Qin Hongge v. 
Beijing Shenzhou Online Technology Co.] (Beijing No. 1 
Interm. People’s Court) 
Valid 
28 深圳力方群英数字科技有限公司诉丘秋 [Shenzhen 
Lifang Qunying Digital Technology Co. v. Qiuqiu] 
(Shenzhen Interm. People’s Court, 2014) 
Valid 
29 林肯电气 (锦州 )焊接材料有限公司诉王雷 (Jinzhou 
Interm. People’s Court, 2014) 
Valid 
30 杭州恒生网络技术服务有限公司诉王云敏[Hangzhou 
Hengsheng Network Technology Service Co.] (Hangzhou 
Interm. People’s Court, 2014) 
Valid 
31 南京倍立达新材料系统工程股份有限公司诉王羿
[Nanjing Beilida New Material System Engineering Corp. 
v. Wangyi] (Nanjing Interm. People’s Court, 2014) 
Valid 
32 邢玉锋诉上海德卡服装科技有限公司[Xing Yufeng v. 
Shanghai Deka Clothing Technology Co.] (Shanghai No. 1 
Interm. People’s Court, 2014) 
Valid 
33 重庆山外山科技有限公司诉尹明兰 [Chongqing 
Shanwaishan Technology Co. v. Yinminglan] (Chongqing 
No. 1 Interm. People’s Court, 2014) 
Valid 
34 佛山市博晖机电有限公司诉翟良松 [Foshan Bohui 
Electromechanical Co. v. Zhai Liangsong] (Foshan 
Interm. People’s Court, 2014) 
Valid 
35 赵建川诉北京神州在线科技有限公司[Zhao Jianchuan 
v. Beijing Shenzhou Online Technology Co.] (Beijing 
Haidian People’s Court, 2014) 
Valid 
36 沈阳和谐文化传播有限公司诉赵岩[Shenyang Hexie 
Culture Communication Co. v. Zhaoyan] (Shenyang 
Interm. People’s Court, 2014) 
Valid 
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